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This article analyzes the motivations of the three presidents of Russia since the end of the 
Soviet Union: Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev. Imagery for the 
achievement, affiliation, and power motives was scored from the texts of annual presidential 
addresses to the Federal Assembly from 1994 through 2018.  Although there were 
fluctuations from president to president, and from year to year within each term, the Russian 
presidents overall tended to be higher in achievement than power.  This contrasts with many 
political leaders from other countries, and suggests modification in previous conclusions 
about the problems of high achievement motivation in politics.  The scores of each president 
are related to the events and policies of that president’s term of office.  The third term of 
Vladimir Putin is particularly interesting, because his achievement scores were lower, and 
power and affiliation scores higher, than in his previous terms.  These changes seem to fit 
with his changes in foreign and domestic policies from his earlier terms.
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Personality of Russian Presidents: A Motivational Analysis, 1994 – 2018
When Is Personality Important in Politics?
Does personality matter in politics?  The question has inspired many debates (see 
Jervis, 2013, for a thorough discussion of the many facets and implications of this question). 
Are situations and institutional frameworks more important for policy outcomes than is the 
personality of its leaders? Greenstein (1969/1975, chap. 2) suggested a middle position, 
specifying four conditions under which a political actor’s personality is crucial for 
determining outcomes: (1) when the actor occupies a strategic position within the political 
system, (2) when the political situation is unstable, (3) when the situation requires 
spontaneous or especially effortful action, and/or (4) when role requirements for leadership 
are unclear.
All four conditions were undoubtedly met in Russia in the years after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Consider the first condition: The Constitution of the 
Russian Federation, adopted in 1993 and amended four years later, gives the president the 
right to propose a prime minister, appoint (and dismiss) ministers of foreign affirs, defense, 
national security, the interior, justice, and emergency situations (Semenova, 2015), as well as 
informing parliament and other authorities about major domestic and foreign developments. 
The resident can also propose specific legislation and initiatives, which have often been 
adopted by parliament and regional authorities (Dmitrieva, 2006).
Regarding the second condition, the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union 
triggered various simultaneous transformations—e.g., democratization of the political system, 
including the creation of a multi-party system and the adoption of free and secret elections; 
and liberalization of the economy, including privatization of state property (Semenova, 
2012)—which taken together contributed to the country’s instability. Consistent with 
Greenstein’s third condition, Russian presidents were expected to act swiftly and forcefully in 
response to various challenges, including violent regional separatism (e.g., Chechnya), and 
economic disasters (e.g., the 1998 financial crisis and default on public and private debt). 
Finally, Greenstein’s fourth condition was realized by the creation of the Russian 
presidency—a new institution with no prior role model or previous experience in democratic 
leadership. These events in post-communist Russia support our basic premise that the 
president’s personality is likely to have played an important role in the political development 
of the Russian Federation.
In this article we present an at-a-distance analysis of the motives of the three Russian 
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Putin (2000-2008 and 2012-   ), and Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012). Each had successes and 
failures during his presidency. For example, Yeltsin helped to create a new, post-communist 
Russia by facilitating the multi-party political system and economic liberalization. However, 
his presidency also was associated with “wild” (i.e., corrupt) capitalism, dubious privatization 
deals, the financial collapse of 1998, and various territorial conflicts within Russia (e.g., in 
the Caucasus). During his first period in office, Putin worked to restore economic stability 
after the economic turbulence of the 1990s, but he also blocked political competition and 
conducted unpopular military actions. In his third period as president, Putin adopted a more 
confrontational foreign and military policy, including the annexation of the Crimea and 
extensive military involvement in the Syrian Civil War. Finally, Medvedev actively promoted 
technological modernization of the Russian economy, but he also continued some of Putin’s 
most criticized policies, such as increasing Russia’s military budget.
Personality in Politics: Theoretical Background and
Empirical Framework
In reviewing research on political leaders’ personalities, Winter (2003a; 2005; 2013) 
employed a conception of personality involving four distinct elements. For each element, 
Table 1 lists typical variables and cites a recent at-a-distance study of a political leader that 
ois based on that element. 
-----------------------------------
Insert Table 1 near here
-----------------------------------
Social contexts. A leader’s many macro- and micro- social contexts (lower-right cell 
of Table 1) can be assessed using traditional biographical, historical, cultural, and 
sociological sources of information and data. For example, in recent years gender has 
emerged from decades of scholarly neglect, as an important context of any leader—male no 
less than female (see Oxley, 2016, and Smith, 2018).
Traits. The adjectives that describe publicly observable regularities of people’s 
behavior constitute their traits. These are traditionally measured through adjective checklists 
or questionnaires filled out either by the people themselves or by others who know them 
(friends, teachers, associates). For trait studies of leaders at a distance, these questionnaires 
are usually filled out by biographers or other experts, as in the Rubenzer and Faschlngbauer 
(2004) study of US presidents. 
Cognitions. Cognitions include a wide variety of concepts and variables involving 
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complexity; Suedfeld, 2010) measured through analysis of verbal or written texts. One of the 
most widely used cognitive variables is operational code, which represents the leader’s 
consciously-expressed view of the nature of the world and politics. Operational codes have 
been inferred from philosophical and instrumental beliefs, as in Dyson’s (2001) study of 
Vladimir Putin, or calculated by computer analysis of various combinations of verbs and 
other words, as in Dyson and Parent’s (2018) later analysis of Putin.
Motives. The current study involves motives—the element of personality providing 
direction (goals) and energy (physiological and behavioral mobilization) for action. Motives 
are implicit, in that they often operate outside of conscious attention. In contrast, people’s 
self-reports are likely to reflect “reasons” (that is, beliefs about what their motives ought to 
be), as well as dissimulation, impression-formation, or even repression, rather than the actual 
motives themselves. Thus motives are often measured by content analysis of verbal and 
written texts, using experimentally-derived scoring systems in the McClelland-Atkinson 
tradition (see Winter, 1973, chap. 3; 1998b). These scoring systems consist of verbal images 
and themes occurring more often in imaginative texts written after the relevant motive has 
been experimentally aroused, as compared to text written under a neutral condition. Implicit 
motives measured in this way (see below) are the personality variables used in the present 
article.
“Motive” is a hybrid concept: motives are stable dispositions, with different persons 
having different characteristic levels; but they are also variable states, depending on what 
incentives are present, how recently the motive was satisfied, and whether there are 
competing motives. (This variability makes possible experimental arousal of motives in order 
to develop scoring systems.) The stable and variable aspects of motives can be illustrated 
with the case of hunger. Hunger and eating vary over time: even the hungriest person 
eventually stops eating and turns to other goals. However, we readily distinguish “big” and 
“small” appetites as a stable dimension of individual difference that involves the number and 
variety of foods (“stimuli”) that can arouse hunger, the slopes and maximum levels of hunger 
arousal, and the slopes of hunger decay after consummatory behavior (i.e., eating). Finally, 
implicit motives can also change over the course of life, in response to specific events, 
experiences, and institutions (See Densiunger & Brandstätter, 2018, for a review). 
Multivariate personality assessment. There is extensive evidence that measures 
from the four different elements of personality are empirically unrelated as well as 
conceptually distinct, even if their names seem similar. Thus implicit and self-report (or 















Motives of Russian Presidents 5
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
Schultheiss, 2014), and both affiliation and power implicit motives are unrelated to the trait 
of extraversion (Poeller, Birk, Baumann, & Mandryk, 2018; Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, 
& Duncan, 1998). However, as Winter et al. (1998) demonstrated, trait variables such as 
extraversion or neuroticism can channel the expression of motives in quite different ways.
Since all four elements contribute to personality, leader assessments that include 
variables from multiple elements are likely to be the most complete and predictively useful. 
Some at-a-distance studies do attempt this; for example, Hermann’s (1984; 2003) widely 
used Leader Trait Assessment system, which Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin, and Ozkececi-Taner 
(2017) employed to study three Turkish prime ministers. In this article, we present data on 
the motivation personality element of three Russian presidents. It would certainly be useful to 
add HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2007) or Big Five (McCrae & Costa, 2008) trait ratings, 
operational codes, and social context descriptions, if these were to become available for all 
three presidents. 
Motivational Dimensions of Personality:
Measurement and Behavioral Outcomes
-----------------------------------
Insert Table 2 near here
-----------------------------------
Motive Scoring
Table 2 presents brief summaries of the scoring definitions of the three motives.1 The 
achievement motive is scored for an expressed concern or desire for excellence, and doing a 
better job. For example, in a political interview, sentences like “Our economy is the only 
economy in the world with five percent growth” are scored as an achievement image. Scoring 
for affiliation involves reference to warm, friendly relations with other people or even nations 
(or concern and sadness about damaged relations), or mention of unity among persons or 
groups. An example sentence would be “We should be compassionate towards refugees.” 
Finally, the power motive is operationalized as concern about having impact on others, 
prestige, or reputation. A political example would be “Our country is the dominant power in 
Europe.” 
Researchers may wonder whether motive imagery, defined in this way by 
experimental arousal, be scored by computer. Eventually this may be possible, but efforts to 
date have produced only moderate correlations (between +.31 and +.54) between computer 
and human scoring (see Pennebaker & King, 1999; Schultheiss, 2013)—well below the usual 
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research (Smith, Feld, & Franz, 1992, p. 526; Winter, 1991, p. 67). The reason is probably 
that these automated motive imagery scorings were based on individual words as the unit of 
analysis, whereas human scoring engages one of the most complex, abstract human 
abilities—to recognize similarities (“images” or “themes”) that may not contain any identical 
elements (“words”). 
-----------------------------------
Insert Table 3 near here
-----------------------------------
Behavioral Outcomes of Three Motivational Dimensions
Decades of research have shown that each motivational dimension is related to 
characteristic specific actions and behavioral outcomes, as shown in Table 3. Winter’s (2010) 
review showed that people who score high in achievement motivation tend to be successful 
business leaders, particularly in small or high-tech companies, because they anticipate 
societal trends, develop strategies and innovations, and organize labor and capital. Moreover, 
they excel at processing information and modifying their performance in response to a 
changing environment. They are hard and persistent workers, but only if they have some 
measure of control over outcomes and they assess their chances of success as realistic. 
Among the negative features of achievement-oriented behavior is a tolerance for illegal 
actions if they help to attain their goals, (This tolerance has obvious implications for politics, 
as will be discussed in the next section.) 
In contrast, people who score high in the affiliation motive are not interested in unique 
accomplishments, but rather in communicating and spending time with other people and 
helping them. Because they seek out other people who are similar to themselves, whom they 
like, and who like them, they develop networks of social support. However, they are less 
agreeable and friendly when working or communicating with people they do not like or 
understand, or whom they see as “different” from themselves. In extreme and stressful 
situations, they may become defensive or even aggressive. Because affiliation-oriented 
people tend to rely on subtle gestures or words to interpret others’ behavior, their reactions to 
others may appear unstable and erratic. Finally, affiliation-oriented people typically do not 
perform well in competitive situations.
People scoring high in power motivation are often active in organizations and 
professions where they can have a direct impact on others, such as teaching, journalism, or 
politics (Winter, 1992). They tend to be successful leaders in large organizations by creating 
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adept at building alliances with lower-status people, and they perform well in small groups 
where they can define the situation and develop strategies. If combined with altruism, self-
control, and a sense of responsibility, power-motivated people may positively influence 
others. However, when their self-control is low, power-oriented people may be so 
competitive and aggressive that they disregard moral principles and social norms. They may 
be vulnerable to taking extreme risks, alcohol or drug abuse, sexual exploitation, and verbal 
or physical aggression.
Previous Research on the Motivation of Political Leaders 
Numerous studies have extended the validity of motive imagery scoring to at-a-
distance analysis of political leaders and historical figures (see reviews by Winter, 2003a; 
2013; 2019). Winter (2002, p. 28) scored achievement, affiliation, and power motive imagery 
scores of first inaugural addresses of American presidents from George Washington to 
George W. Bush, later adding scores for Obama (Winter, 2011a) and Trump (Winter, 2018b). 
Researchers have also studied the motives and behavioral outcomes of individual leaders, 
such as Richard Nixon (Winter & Carlson, 1988), George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev (Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, & Walker, 1991), Bill Clinton, and 
Saddam Hussein (Winter, 1998a; 2003b). Motive variables were included in studies of 
Canadian political leaders (Suedfeld, Conway III, & Eichhorn, 2001), 1996 Russian 
presidential candidates (Valenty & Shiraev, 2001), and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu 
(Kimhi, 2001). Related measures of power and affiliation motives (along with other 
characteristics measured at a distance) have been used to construct personality profiles of 
various world leaders (Hermann, 1983; 1988; Snare, 1992). 
Studies of behaviors and outcomes associated with presidential motives have found 
that power motivation is associated with historians’ ratings of “presidential greatness” (see 
also Winter, 2010). In contrast, although achievement motivation (usually associated with 
entrepreneurial success in business) was related to ratings of idealism, it was unrelated or 
even negatively related to rated presidential performance.  Winter (2010) suggested that in 
democratic politics, as contrasted with business, many factors are outside presidents’ control.  
In frustration, they may change staff (for example, Donald Trump), cut ethical corners 
(Richard Nixon), micromanage (Jimmy Carter), or exhaust themselves physically (Woodrow 
Wilson). Depending on the level of frustration and the structure and traditions of the political 
system, the “illegal” aspect of high achievement motivation noted above may emerge as 
corruption2, even a full-blown kleptocracy—or in extreme cases, a military coup d’etat, as 
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Power-motivated presidents (Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy, Reagan) are better able to 
manage these frustrations of politics through a variety of strategies such as humor or using 
personal representatives to cut through bureaucracy. Affiliation-motivated presidents tend to 
conclude arms limitation agreements, but are vulnerable to political scandals—perhaps 
because they are overly influenced by those they perceive to be friends.
Research on leaders from other countries has replicated some of these results.  For 
example, an analysis of twenty-two southern African leaders (Winter 1980) showed a strong 
correlation between leaders’ level of power motivation and experts’ assessments of their 
propensity to use violence. In a sample of 45 world leaders, Hermann (1980b) found that 
affiliation-oriented leaders adopted cooperative foreign policies, whereas power-motivated 
leaders were more confrontational. And in a sample of Soviet Politburo members in the 
1970s, Hermann (1980a) showed that high affiliation and low power motivation were 
positively related to a pro-detente stance toward the United States and Western Europe. 
Study Design and Methods
The research reported in this article was designed to assess the characteristic 
achievement, affiliation, and power motive imagery of the three presidents of Russia since 
the end of the Soviet Union, over the years of their holding that office.  Using these scores, 
we then interpret some of their actions and performance in office, and suggest possible future 
outcomes.  
Identifying Documents
The Russian presidents’ motives were scored from verbatim texts of their annual 
presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly (upper and lower chambers of the Russian 
parliament), along with top government officials, religious leaders, and media 
representatives. These speeches were selected for analysis because they were given on 
comparable occasions, to comparable audiences. With situational influences thus 
standardized and controlled insofar as possible, differences in motive imagery scores are 
more likely to reflect actual personality levels—and perhaps even more important, changes in 
these levels over time.
Yeltsin’s addresses began in 1994 and usually occurred in February or March. Putin’s 
first address was in July 2000, but the next three took place in April or May. Since 2008, 
these speeches have been given toward the end of the year, usually in November or 
December. (There was no 2017 address, but an address was given in March 2018.) 
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The 24 presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly from 1994 through 2018 were 
copied into separate documents.  Each document was then divided into separate one-page 
excerpts and each excerpt was given a unique identification number. All excerpts were 
randomly mixed together and scored for achievement, affiliation, and power motive imagery, 
according to the manual developed by Winter (1994), by trained, expert scorers who had 
demonstrated the .85 scoring reliability on material pre-coded by expert scorers that is the 
standard for motive imagery research (Smith, Feld, & Franz, 1992, p. 526). Scorers were 
blind to the date of the address, the name of the president, and the hypotheses underlining this 
study. The results for each speech were expressed in terms of motive images per 1,000 words. 
Results
Table 4 gives the date, length, and motive scores for each speech, as well as Ms and 
SDs for each presidential term, and for all 24 speeches. Overall, achievement was slightly 
(though not quite significantly) higher than power; as might be expected in political speeches 
of this kind, affiliation imagery scores were much lower.  A one-way ANOVA of the 24 
scores showed only a near-significant difference among the three presidents in affiliation (F = 
3.16, df = 2, 21, p = .063), with Putin significantly higher, and Medvedev nonsignificantly 
higher, than Yeltsin.  Putin showed significantly higher variance in power than Yeltsin, and 
significantly higher variance in achievement than Medvedev.
-----------------------------------
Insert Table 4 near here
-----------------------------------
Copnsidering the scores of all three presidents, achievement and power varied over 
time, but without significant trends.  Affiliation, however, increased significantly over time 
across (r between year and affiliation images/1000 words = +.64, p < .001). The three 
presidents showed different patterns of motive change over time. Over his six years as 
president, Yeltsin declined oin all three motives (significant only for power, r = -.82, p = 
.048), perhaps reflecting his declining health and increased cognitive problems. Over four 
years, Medvedev showed a significant increase in achievement motivation (r = .95, p = .051). 
Over 14 years (with a 4-year gap between the eighth and ninth years as president), Putin 
showed a striking and significant increase in affiliation (r = .72, p <.01).  
--------------------------------------------
Insert Figures 1 and 2 near here
--------------------------------------------
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average motive scores by term, based on individual speech scores that were standardized 
separately for each motive, with overall M = 500 and SD = 100. (This is close to the 
standardization formerly used on the Scholastic Aptitude Test and Graduate Records 
Examination.) Figure 2 presents the ratio of (unstandardized) achievement to power. Based 
on Winter’s (2010) analysis of achievement motivation in politics, this can be taken as a 
measure of the president’s potential to experience frustration in the political sphere. 
Compared to US presidents (Winter, 2002), all three Russian presidents scored high. The 
decrease of this ratio, from Putin’s first two terms and from Medvedev’s term, to Putin’s third 
term is of special interest (for the former comparison, Ms = 1.63 and .95, SDs = .61 and .18; 
t = 2.66, df = 8, p = .029). The change suggests that Putin’s motivational shift from 
achievement to power coincided with a corresponding change in strategies of control (see 
Winter, 2010, pp. 1649-1650), greater success in gaining that control, and consequently fewer 
frustrations and more satisfactions. These changes will be discussed in greater detail below.
Motive Scores and Presidential Actions and Outcomes
Are the motive scores of Russian presidents associated with actions and outcomes in 
the same ways as they are among US presidents and other world leaders?  The small number 
of presidents makes it difficult to answer to this question with the usual statistical procedures 
(e.g., as Winter, 2002, has done with US presidents and Hermann, 1980a, with Soviet 
Politburo members); nevertheless, the scores can be used to interpret aspects of Russian 
presidential politics and history during the 1995-2018 period, focusing especially on the 
relative achievement and power scores. Winter’s (2010) research has shown that leaders with 
achievement imagery higher than power imagery are vulnerable to the frustrations of politics; 
in contrast, low scorers are more successful in politics, but are vulnerable to the dangers of 
untamed power drives—most notably aggression. Finally, we compare our findings to 
previous findings on Soviet leaders and American presidents, and formulate theoretical and 
practical implications of our study.
Boris Yeltsin
For the three speeches during his first term, Yeltsin’s scores for each motive were 
similar to the overall averages for all 24 speeches. During his second term, however, average 
scores on all three motives were the lowest of any presidential term. This contrasts sharply 
with his earlier Soviet-era image as an economic and political reformer, or his role in 
profoundly transformating Russian politics and economy after the end of the Soviet Union. 
These 1997-99 motive levels doubtless reflect his age and especially his many health 
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1999). Thus at the time of his December 31, 1999 resignation, an American journalist wrote 
that “Yeltsin, who had once been the epitome of vigor and energy, at the end was often 
hidden, isolated and ill at his country dacha” (Hoffman, 2000).
Earlier, Yeltsin’s February 1996 speech shortly before his re-election emphasized 
Russia’s extraordinary achievements during his first term, showed a very high achievement-
power ratio of 1.49. Yet for all these accomplishments, Yeltsin experienced the characteristic 
frustration of achievement motivation in politics, as his reforms became mired in 
confrontations with the so-called oligarchs who controlled the Rusian economy and with the 
Communist-controlled State Duma (lower chamber of parliament) and regional authorities, as 
well as his declining popularity (White, 2011). His final 1999 address, with achievement 
motivation at its lowest point and power motivation increased, coincided with an attempt at 
strengthening federal control over regional authorities. 
Dmitry Medvedev
On average, Medvedev’s four speeches scored very high in achievement imagery, 
with the highest achievement-power ratio (1.64) of the three presidents. This pattern is 
consistent with his reputation as an able modernizing administrator, as well as with many of 
his actions as president.4 In his November 2009 remarks on the global financial crisis, for 
example, he proposed modernizing the Russian economy by emphasizing high technology 
and innovation. (This speech had the highest achievement-power ratio (2.29) of all 24 
presidential speeches.) One of his final presidential accomplishments was the completion of 
Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization, which augured well for the Russian 
economy.  Appropriately enough, the formal accession ceremony occurred a few days before 
Medvedev’s final speech to the Federal Assembly, which had the highest level of 
achievement imagery of his four speeches.
Medvedev’s first address in November 2008, however, showed the opposite pattern, 
with power greater than achievement (achievement-power ratio of 0.86). This speech 
occurred only three months after the brief but intense war between Russia and Georgia. The 
conflict had roots going back to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and was focused on South 
Ossetia and Abkazia, two formerly autonomous regions of Georgia whose independence was 
supported by Russia but not recognized by Georgia or most other countries.  More broadly, 
the conflict highlighted complex and problematic relations between Russia, many former 
Soviet republics, and the West. Thus Medvedev’s elevated power motive score in that 2008 
speech can be linked to that border conflict, which is consistent with Winter’s (2018a) 
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Vladimir Putin—First and Second Terms
Putin’s motive profiles are of special interest, both because as of 2019 he has served 
much longer than any other Russian president, and also because his third-term profile (2012-
2018) is quite different from that of his first two terms (2000-2007). Changes in Putin’s 
motive profile can perhaps explain some of the great differences in actions and outcomes 
between the two periods of his presidency. 
In five of eight speeches during Putin’s first two terms, achievement was higher than 
power. This is consistent with his early focus on career preparation and success, as well as his 
hard work and persistence when the chances of success are at least moderate (see Putin, 
Gevorkyan, Timakova, & Kolesnikov, 2000, pp. 1-44 passim).  Looking back on his first two 
terms, he recalled that “all these eight years I plowed like a slave on galleys, from morning to 
night, and did it with all my might” (RIA Novosti, 2008). 
Achievement-motivated successes. Consistent with his relatively high achievement 
motivation scores, Putin initially focused on rebuilding an economy seriously weakened by 
the 1998 crisis, and strengthening central authority over regions. Opposition from the 
oligarchs, who had grown powerful during Yeltsin’s presidency, could have created a 
problem of control typical of those encountered by achievement-motivated political leaders 
(see Winter, 2010, pp. 1646-1649); however, Putin was able to break their power by 
controlling the media and launching criminal prosecutions of major oligarchs such as Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky (YUKOS petroleum conglomerate) and Vladimir Gusinskiy (Media-Most 
conglomerate). These “powerful” actions were given an achievement-related rationale—that 
“the basic reforms and privatization of the 1990s were so flawed and unfair that they created 
an unstable business environment” (Goldman, 2004, p. 34). 
In 2004, Putin countered centrifugal tendencies within Russia by abolishing regional 
gubernatorial elections. Instead, regional parliaments selected governors from a set of 
candidates proposed by the Russian president; moreover, governors can be dismissed by the 
president (Semenova, 2012). Governors of the national republics within Russia also lost their 
unilateral power to collect taxes and sign international treaties.  
Overall, during Putin’s first two terms several factors made it relatively easy to exert 
strong control, while shielding him from many of the problems encountered by US presidents 
with high achievement motivation (see Winter, 2010): the newness of the Russian political 
structures and procedures, the magnitude of the problems, public opposition to the emerging 
oligarchs, and Russia’s improving economic situation, helped by high world prices for oil and 
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International Monetary Fund, 2018). Finally, strengthened central authority in the regions 
was perceived positively by the general population (Levada-Center, 2018). 
Foreign affairs problems. On the other hand, the Russian economic success was 
tempered by several continuing problems in foreign affairs that arose during Putin’s first two 
terms, which may be connected with his occasional bursts of power motive imagery.5 For 
example, the high power score of his 2000 first speech was likely a response to the previous 
year’s Wahhabi Islamic movement attacks in the Dagestan region (adjacent to Chechnya), 
which led to the Second Chechen War as well as terrorist attacks in Moscow and elsewhere. 
His 2006 power score of 28.90—the highest of all 24 presidential speeches—may have been 
affected by the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute.
Initially Putin maintained a cooperative relationship with the West; for example, 
assisting the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However, this 
cooperation failed to deflect NATO from expanding right up to the borders of Russia. By 
March 2004, NATO included virtually all of the Warsaw Pact countries as well as the three 
Baltic Republics formerly part of the Soviet Union—despite the common impression of US 
assurances that NATO would not expand eastward.6  And only three months after the 
September 11 attacks, and despite Russian criticism, US President George W. Bush withdrew 
from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union. Subsequent plans for a US-
led missile defense system based in Poland and the Czech Republic were seen by Russian 
leaders as ignoring their concerns. Finally, toward the end of Putin’s first term the U.S. 
invaded Iraq, despite opposition from Russia (as well as France and many other countries). 
Overall, Putin’s ambition to have Russia’s status as a great power restored and recognized (a 
Russian quest that dates back to medieval times; see Neumann, 2008a; 2008b) seemed to 
have been blocked.
Vladimir Putin—Third Term
After serving four years as Prime minister during Medvedev’s presidential term, Putin 
was elected to his third term in 2012 and then a fourth term in March 2018.7 His third-term 
speeches showed a very different motive profile from those of his earlier terms. Power was 
quite high: five of the six third-term speeches scored above the overall mean of the 24 
speeches, and all six had achievement/power ratios below the mean. Many policies and 
events of Putin’s third term fit with this changed profile.  
Increased power motivation, relative to achievement. The effects of Putin’s 
increased power motivation were visible in both words and deeds. The overthrow of 
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and the West since the end of the Cold War.  Shortly after Yanukovich fled to Russia, 
Russian troops and pro-Russian paramilitary groups took control of the Crimean peninsula 
(historically part of the Russian Empire, but since 1954 part of Ukraine8); in late March, 
Russia formally annexed Crimea. Despite Western economic sanctions, fighting between pro-
Russian forces and Ukrainian government troops has continued in the eastern Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions of Ukraine (referred to by Putin as the historical Novorossiya or “New 
Russia”).  
In December 2014 Putin promulgated a “new military doctrine” that amounted to a 
“sea change” in Russian foreign policy and security and defense postures. The doctrine listed 
as “key military risks” the enhanced capabilities of NATO, “which brings the alliance 
infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders,” and “foreign force deployments close to Russia” as 
well as US ballistic missile defense plans and its Global Strike9 concept. In addition, the 
notion of “military risk” was further elaborated to include information and communication 
technologies (Trenin, 2014).  
In September 2015, Russia intervened in the Syrian Civil War against several groups 
fighting Syrian government forces (and in many cases fighting among themselves), including 
a coalition of opposition groups opposed to Bashar al-Assad and supported by various Middle 
Eastern countries, as well as the United States. Russia also opposed the Islamic State (ISIS). 
All these military actions were consistent with Putin’s elevated third-term power motivation 
scores. They also appeared to reflect his nostalgia for Russia’s lost superpower status, which 
had earlier led him to claim that “the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical 
disaster of the [20th] century.”10 
Partly as a consequence of these policies, Russian relationships with the United States, 
the European Union, and Ukraine deteriorated considerably during Putin’s third term.11 
Economic sanctions imposed on Russia by American and many West European countries 
were criticized by the Russian leadership, with Putin feeling “rage at being told what he could 
do and not do in what he considered his own backyard” (Shane & Mazzetti, 2018).  Russian 
cyber-hacking and internet influence capabilities were mobilized to interfere with the 
November 2016 US presidential election—wreaking revenge on former US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, helping the campaign of her opponent Donald Trump, and more generally 
destabilizing democratic attitudes and processes (Jamieson, 2018; Shane & Mazzetti, 2018). 
Similar Russian cyber attempts to sway public opinion through social media were launched 
during the June 2016 “Brexit” referendum in the Unied Kingdom (House of Commons 
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presidential election (Willsher & Henley, 2017) and the November 2018 US midterm 
Congressional election (Goldman, 2018). 
Despite enjoying a broad public support for his foreign policy (Levada-Center, 2018), 
Putin’s third term also brought domestic protests that elicited official crackdowns, beginning 
with December 2011 protests claiming the parliamentary election was flawed, and including 
the famous performance of the feminist punk rock group Pussy Riot inside Moscow’s 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior, for which three group members were convicted of 
“hooliganism” (a catch-all term for unapproved behavior). In March 2017, demonstrations—
some legal, most illegal—protesting “blatant and unabashed corruption” and “enthusiasm for 
challenging the authorities” took place in 100 Russian cities and towns (Higgins & Kramer, 
2017).  
Taken together, these foreign (specifically military) and domestic actions of the 
Russian leadership can be readily understood as expressions of Putin’s increased power 
motivation (desire to have impact), as well as decreased achievement orientation (rational 
cooperation in pursuit of excellent outcomes).
 Increased affiliation motivation. Finally, during his third term Putin’s affiliation 
imagery scores imagery increased substantially and significantly over those of his first period 
as president (Ms and [SDs] = 5.93 [2.16] and 2.89 [.90], respectively; t = 3.61, p = .004), as 
well as those of Yeltsin (t = 3.67, p = .002) and Medvedev (t = 2.65, p = .035). At the same 
time, Putin’s public opinion rating (approval minus disapproval) actually declined slightly, 
from an average of 54 percent to 53 percent (data from the Levada Analytical Center, which 
has been critical oif the Kremlin; Levada-Center, 2018). A closer examination of the 
relationship between Putin’s approval ratings and his affiliation imagery shows an interesting 
difference between Putin’s first and second periods as president. During his first two terms, 
there was a strong negative relationship between Putin’s approval rating during the two 
months before each speech and the level of affiliation in that speech (r = -.73, p = .041).  In 
other words, declines in Putin’s approval were followed by increased affiliation imagery. In 
everyday language: in 2000-2007, when Putin perceived that he is not liked, his concern with 
establishing friendly relations increased. In 2012-2018, however, this relationship 
disappeared (r = -.11, p = ns), even though the affiliation levels in this period were much 
higher. during this latter period, Putin’s approval ratings did not affect his subsequent 
expression of affiliation imagery.
How can Putin’s changing levels of affiliation motivation be explained and 
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Putin might have high affiliation motivation (particularly in his third term) may seem 
surprising—even impossible.  While it is true that the affiliation motive can lead people to 
have warm friendly relations with others, it can also lead to defensive, even aggressive 
reactions. The critical factor is how those “others” are perceived: are they close, similar, 
agreeing with and liking one’s self?  Or are they distant, dissimilar, disagreeing, and 
disliking? This “closeness-similarity-agreeing-liking” complex is key understanding the 
duality of affiliation motivation: high levels make people friendlier to their friends, and more 
hostile to those perceived as “enemies.” An illustrative example from terrorism research: 
Smith (2008) and Winter (2011b) found that documents from terrorist organizations scored 
actually higher in affiliation motivation than similar documents from matched nonterrorist 
organizations—but that affiliation motive was directed only toward their own groups, rather 
than to other groups or people in general. In other words, terrorists do not lack concerns for 
affiliation and love; rather, they channel such concerns exclusively toward their own group. 
In the light of Putin’s strong support of traditional Russian historical, territorial, 
cultural, and religious beliefs and values—including persecution of members of “extremist” 
organizations such as Jehovah’s Witnesses (Chan, 2017; Higgins, 2018), his increased third-
term levels of affiliation imagery seem to be directed only toward the ingroup—an 
ideological, ethnic, and historical “enclave Russia”—the doctrine that “Moscow is the Third 
Rome”—and so must be preserved, protected, and defended against perceived threats from 
decadent  and godless “western” values and practices. 
Understanding Putin’s motive profile change. What caused the substantial change 
in Putin’s motive profiles between his first two terms and his third term? The experiences and 
results of those first two terms, as noted by Trenin (2015) may provide a clue. In the early 
years of his first term, Putin did extol “Russia’s existing or potential great power status” 
(Light, 2015, p. 15), but he also sought “to restore and upgrade Russian-Western relations,” 
particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (p. 34). Although these overtures continued into 
Medvedev’s administration, Putin became disillusioned with what he saw as poor results.  
When he resumed the presidency in 2012, “the renowned pragmatist had turned into a 
missionary”; rather than integrate with the West, he would preserve “Russia’s distinct 
identity in a highly competitive global environment” (p. 35). To summarize: Putin’s 
expressed motives changed—from frustrated achievement to power and control—in response 
to perceived changes in the situation, especially the actions of foreign and domestic 
counterplayers. 
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reflected in analyses of Putin’s operational code at different points in his presidency. At the 
beginning of his first term, Dyson (2001) pointed out that his belief in harmonious relations 
was highly contingent, suggesting that for Putin, “political life is harmonious to the degress 
that it is governed and regulated by norms, laws and rules” (p. 334), but with the condition 
that he would not “act in a norm-bound manner when those with which he is engaged do 
not.” Thus “Putin is unlikely to ‘stick to the rules’ in the face of deviation by another, in the 
hope that his own conformity will eventually encourage a reciprocation” (p. 344). 
In a later analysis, using automated text coding, Dyson and Parent (2018) suggested 
that because “re-establishing the power of the state, and specifically the presidency, has been 
a priority . . . Putin’s military interventions, in particular toward Chechnya, Ukraine, and 
Syria, are fundamentally about his perception that chaos and state weakness are existential 
threats” (p. 93). Similarly, the outster of Ukrainian President Yanukovych “was seen by Putin 
as another example of what he portrayed as Western-orchestrated regime changes,” with 
himself “potentially the next target” (p. 94).12 Thus he came to see the United States, the 
European Union, and NATO as more and more hostile.13 
Comparing Russian Presidents to Soviet General Secretaries and U.S. Presidents
For political leaders as well as ordinary people, one of the most familiar and 
accessible ways of describing a person is to compare them to some other familiar person: for 
example, “She reminds me of X,” or “He is the complete opposite of Y.” Motive profiles can 
be used to refine such comparisons and the predictions that can be derived from them. 
Because the three achievement, affiliation, and power motives are conceptualized as defining 
orthogonal dimensions of a three-dimensional space (power as up-down, achievement as 
forward-backward, affiliation as near-far), each person’s profile can be represented as a point 
in that space. The similarity of any two motive profiles is therefore the inverse of the 
3-dimensional distance between their respective points, adapting the familiar Euclidian 
formula: ��������=  �2��ℎ +  �2��� +  �2���
In this equation, Dach = the difference between the two achievement scores, Daff  = the 
difference in affiliation scores, and Dpow = the difference in power scores. (To weight the 
motives equally, scores on each motive are standardized separately.) 
Table 5 presents the results of comparing the average profiles of each Russian 
presidential term with those of two other groups of leaders: (a) the four General Secretaries of 
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Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and Mikhail Gorbachev), based on their first “Political report 
[or Organizational Report] of the Central Committee” to a party congress (data from Schmitt 
& Winter, 1998)14; and (b) US presidents of the 20th and 21st centuries, based on their first 
inaugural addresses (from Winter, 2002; 2011a; 2018b). Motive scores were standardized, 
separately for each motive, within each comparison groups.
-----------------------------------
Insert Table 5 near here
-----------------------------------
Based on similarity of motive profile, Yeltsin most closely resembled an interesting—
and seemingly quite diverse—array of other leaders: in his first term, US presidents Ronald 
Reagan and Woodrow Wilson, and Soviet leader Brezhnev; in his second term, presidents 
Calvin Coolidge and Franklin Roosevelt, and Stalin. (Unlike these leaders, Yeltsin scored 
below average on all three motives, but V-shaped profile—achievement and power relatively 
high, affiliation much lower—does resemble the profiles of these four leaders. 
Medvedev resembled several more liberal leaders: Gorbachev, and presidents Wilson 
and Lyndon Johnson. Throughout his periods as president, Putin most closely resembled 
Brezhnev among Soviet leaders—even more closely in his third term. (It is interesting that 
Russians consider Putin and Brezhnev as the best political leaders since the early 20th 
century; Levada-Center, 2017.) In his first two terms, he also resembled presidents Reagan, 
Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt, but later he came to resemble the more combative Kennedy 
and Truman. It is interesting—and perhaps consequential for Russian-US relations—that 
Donald Trump is consistently among the least similar US presidents to all three Russian 
presidents. 
-----------------------------------
Insert Figure 3 near here
-----------------------------------
Figure 3 presents the year-by-year motive profile “distances” between the profiles of 
Russian and US presidents during the 1994-2018 period.  The US profiles are based on each 
president’s first inaugural address, whereas the Russian profiles are based on the averages of 
those speeches that occurred during the corresponding US president’s time in office. During 
this period the average distance between Russian and US presidents—2.36 standard-deviation 
units—was relatively great, with Yeltsin-Clinton and Putin 3rd term-Obama as slightly more 
similar to each other, in comparison to the other three pairs. Whether these distances (or 
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interesting topic for future research.
Discussion
Rethinking the Theory of Achievement Motivation in Politics
This article provides a new perspective on the fate of achievement motivation in 
politics. Overall, the Russian speeches show higher levels of achievement motivation, relative 
to power, than do US presidential inaugural addresses. In the Russian presidents we do see 
some traces of the “problems” of achievement motivation identified by Winter (2010); 
nevertheless, they do not seem as frustrated, even immobilized, as do their achievement-
motivated US counterparts. While some of the motive imagery differences may reflect 
differences in the occasion and type of speech, or even liberal-versus-conservative scoring of 
motive imagery, they may also reflect differences in political institutions and structures, and 
even national history.  
In a political system of checks and balances, such as the United States, a president’s 
scope for making decisions and implementing policies is likely to be constrained by other 
institutions of government. In such systems, power-motivated presidents are likely to be more 
successful because they enjoy and are adept at playing in political “scrimmages,” as well as 
appealing to voters. On the other hand, Winter (2010, p. 1661) pointed out that prime 
ministers by definition usually enjoy a legislative majority (unless they head a coalition or a 
minority government, or their party is in disarray); thus an achievement-motivated leader in 
parliamentary systems may have a less obstructed path to control. The Russian data suggest 
another contrast: while transitioning to democratcy, formerly-authoritarian countries may 
require—and—reward, transformational leaders (see Burns, 1978) who are likely to have 
high levels of achievement motivation, and who are able to reorganize and create new 
economic and political structures—rather than transactional leaders who may have other 
motives, such as power.
Limitations
There are limitations to the present research.  Following prior studies of motivational 
profiles of U.S. presidents (Winter 2002), we have calculated motive profiles through content 
analysis of regular formal public speeches, but the analysis could be expanded to include 
more frequent and less formal remarks, such as at news conferences. More systematic 
dependent variables, for example reflecting military action or pooled judgments of expert 
observers, could be calculated from archival sources or surveys. 
In this article, as in past research on political leaders (e.g., Winter, 2002), we have 
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particular, their annual addresses. Testing this assumption in a wider variety of situational 
and institutional settings would add to our understanding of presidential motivation, and 
taking into account additional settings would allow for larger sample sizes and greater 
variation in motive imagery. Moreover, considering the motive profiles of presidents and 
their interaction with followers could be useful for exploring and understanding charismatic 
leadership. 
Finally, increased understanding of the motivational profiles of transformational 
versus transactional leaders can open up new avenues of research in political contexts. For 
example, some post-Soviet countries (in particular, the Baltic countries) successfully 
democratized, most post-Soviet countries of Central Asia (e.g., Turkmenistan) and Russia 
under Putin have become consolidated authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2018).  Future 
studies could explore the role of political leaders in this “authoritarian backsliding.” 
Footnotes
1 The complete system for scoring motive imagery in running text, along with practice 
materials and expert scoring, is available at no cost at this website: 
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/117563  
2 For 38 US presidents from George Washington through Barack Obama, achievement 
motivation is significantly correlated with estimated peak wealth expressed in 2016 US 
dollars (r = .27, 1-tailed p = .05). While this is consistent with a connection between 
achievement motivation and political corruption/kleptocracy,  it certainly does not prove such 
a link. Presidential wealth data are taken from < 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States_by_net_worth >.
3 Available online at < www.kremlin.ru/events >; English translations available online 
at < en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages
4 Some analysts have asked whether Medvedev was his own man, or rather a place-
holder (“puppet”?) for Putin. While the answer would be relevant to the analysis of 
Medvedev as a person, it does not affect the analysis of the Russian president as a role. As 
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personalities of the loose collectivity referred to as “the administration” or “the Russian 
government” (see Winter, 2002, pp., 46-47). The real question is whether the resulting scores 
lead to accurate predictions about the actions and outcomes.
5 Domestic factors, such as the mass protests of unpopular reforms of social benefits 
and hunger strikes by State Duma parliamentarians, which precipitated the first decrease in 
Putin’s popularity (Levada-Center, 2018), may also have contributed to Putin’s increased 
power imagery in 2004.
6 For a recent dialog on the question of US guarantees about NATO expansion, see the 
exchange by Kramer and Itzkowitz Shifrinson (2017). The December 2017 and March 2018 
postings of declassified US, Soviet, German, British, and French documents by the National 
Security Archive supports the notion that the US gave guarantees against expansion. These 




7 The length of presidential terms was increased from four to six years in December 
2008, but this did not apply retroactively to Medvedev, who had been elected in March of 
that year.
8 The 1954 transfer was officially explained as due to “close economic connections 
and territorial proximity,” as well as for “further strengthening of brotherly ties between the 
Ukrainian and Russian peoples” (Salisbury, 1954).  Actually, Party General Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev probably hoped that the transfer would create Ukrainian support for his later 
successful effort to oust Georgy Malenkov as Soviet leader.
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would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on earth in as little as an hour.
10 Putin’s 2005 speech to the Federal Assembly, official English translation available 
online at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931 .
11 Another incident contributing to worsened relations with the west was the March 
2017 poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal (characterized by Putin 
as “a traitor to the motherland . . . simply a scumbag, that’s all”; Reuters, 2018) and his 
daughter in Salisbury, England. 
12 Putin has also condemned the “colored revolutions” in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia as 
“Western-led” regime changes (RIA, 2017).
13 Schafer, Nurmanova, and Walker (2015) give a similar analysis of Putin’s 
operational code, which could be summarized in everyday language as follows: “Cooperation 
is possible; I even tried it: but events were not as much in my control as I thought, and so I 
have turned to conflict in those situations where I do have control.”
14 Georgy Malenkov, the Soviet leader from 1953-1955, did not hold the position of 
General Secretary, and General Secretaries Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko did not 
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Table 1.
Elements of personality measured at a distance




Cognitions: measured by experts’ 
ratings, and/or analysis of texts
Beliefs and values





Self-concept and ego ideals (“heroes”)
Narcissism versus wisdom
Example at-a-distance study: Dyson 
& Parent (2018)
Traits and temperament: measured by 
ratings or questionnaires






HEXACO (Big Five factors plus  
“honesty”) 
Example at-a-distance study: Visser, 
Book, & Volk (2017)
Situation-
dependent
Motives: measured by implicit
analysis of texts




Social contexts: measured from 
standard social science and 
biographical sources
Culture and social structure
History
Gender 
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Defense mechanisms




Experiences in prior institutions (e.g., 
government, military, university)
Example at-a-distance study: Smith 
(2018)
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Table 2.
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Imagery type Definition
Achievement Someone is concerned about a standard of excellence:
 Directly, by words indicating the quality of performance, or 
indirectly, by actions clearly suggesting a concern for 
excellence, or by success in competition.
 By negative emotions or counter-striving in response to failure.
 By carrying out some unique, unprecedented accomplishment. 
Affiliation Someone is concerned about establishing, maintaining or restoring 
friendship or friendly relations among persons, groups, etc.
 By expression of positive, friendly, or intimate feelings toward 
other characters, nations, etc.
 By expression of sadness or other negative feeling about 
separation or disruption of a friendly relationship, or wanting to 
restore it.
 By affiliative, companionate activities.
 By friendly, nurturant acts.
Power Someone is concerned about having impact, control, or influence on 
another person, group, or the world at large
 By taking strong, forceful actions that inherently have impact on 
other people or the world at large.
 By controlling or regulating others.
 By attempting to influence, persuade, convince, make or prove a 
point, argue.
 By giving unsolicited help or advice.
 By impression others or the world at large; prestige or 
reputation.
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Note: Adapted from Winter (1994). This summary is not adequate for scoring purposes; 
however, the complete scoring system, along with practice materials and expert scoring, is 
available at no cost at this website: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/117563 
Table 3.

















defensive and even 
hostile under threat
Leadership and high 
morale of 
subordinates, if high 
in sense of 
responsibility; 
profligate 
impulsivity, if low 
in sense of 
responsibility
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Major reference Schultheiss and 
Brunstein (2010, 




chap. 3), Smith 




chap. 1), Smith 
(1992, chaps. 19 and 
21)
Note: adapted from Winter (2003a, p. 139).
Table 4.
Motive imagery scores of Russian presidents’ speeches, 1995-2015
Images/1000 words








Yeltsin – 1 1994, Feb 24 15,755 21.45 4.82 17.58 1.22
1995, Feb 16 20,767 15.51 1.78 15.02 1.03











Yeltsin – 2 1997, Mar 6 13,710 14.30 .80 13.86 1.03
1998, Feb 17 14,893 19.34 2.35 10.14 1.91
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Images/1000 words








Putin – 1 2000, Jul 8 5,256 16.93 3.81 20.93 .81
2001, Apr 3 6,455 17.51 1.55 14.87 1.18
2002, Apr 18 5,752 16.00 2.80 14.10 1.13











Putin – 2 2004, May 10 5,217 15.90 2.10 17.60 .90
2005, Apr 25 5,212 17.27 4.22 9.98 1.73
2006, May 10 6,529 14.20 2.80 28.90 .49











Medvedev 2008, Nov 5 8,325 16.34 2.28 19.10 .86
2009, Nov 12 9,485 18.34 2.21 8.01 2.29
2010, Nov 30 7,228 20.20 4.15 10.65 1.90











Putin - 3 2012, Dec 12 9,236 11.48 5.63 13.10 .88
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Images/1000 words








2014, Dec 4 7,028 12.70 3.60 18.50 .69
2015, Dec 3 6,107 15.90 3.80 18.20 .87
2016, Dec 1 7,324 27.03 9.42 24.30 1.11





















Note: All speeches were taken from the website of the Russian presidency: 
www.kremlin.ru/events    
Table 5.
Comparing Motive Profiles of Russian Presidents, Soviet Leaders, and US Presidents
Russian 
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Russian 
president Most similar leader Distance Least similar leader Distance
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev 1.50 Joseph Stalin 2.29









Soviet leader Joseph Stalin 1.28 Nikita Khrushchev 2.82









Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 1.18 Joseph Stalin 2.35









Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev 1.29 Joseph Stalin 2.37









Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev 1.30 Mikhail Gorbachev 2.14
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Russian 
president Most similar leader Distance Least similar leader Distance
Putin, term 3
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev .61 Joseph Stalin 3.48






















































































































































Average motive profile distance between Russian and US presidents, 1994-2016 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
1994-99
Yeltsin-
Clinton
2001-07 
Putin-Bush  
2009-11 
Medvedev-
Obama
2012-16 
Putin/3-
Obama
2017-18
Putin/3-
Trump
3
-d
im
e
n
si
o
n
a
l 
d
is
ta
n
ce
 i
n
 S
D
 u
n
it
s
 
  
 
pops_12652_f3.docx
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
A
u
th
o
r 
M
a
n
u
s
c
ri
p
t
